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Saving Iraq
8/23/15
In the post-Saddam Iraq, successive Iraqi governments used every trick in the book to manipulate Iraqis and to justify their failure in effectively governing the country. Sectarian policies followed by these governments are responsible for the grim situation of Iraq.
This time, however, Iraqi Shiites have risen up and taken to the streets to express their dissatisfaction over the systematic failure of the governments to deliver on their basic needs. Not surprisingly, Iraqis have reached a point where even pro-government Iraqis could not tolerate corruption and the government’s indifference to their daily needs such as electricity especially during a very hot summer.
Iraqis are talking about tens of billions of dollars wasted during the last decade. Adding insult to injury is the report released by the parliament’s security and defense committee on the fall of Mosul to Daesh last year. The report squarely blames former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki along with senior army commanders and key ministers. If anything, the report could serve as the basis for prosecuting and perhaps indicting Al-Maliki. The report states that the army lacked preparedness just before the fall of Mosul and it turned a blind eye to Daesh’s activities in Mosul like collection of taxes. The army’s corruption in Iraq is not a news flash. It is an open secret. Indeed, upon his assumption of power in September 2014, Prime Minister Al-Abadi learned that some 50,000 soldiers are indeed “ghost soldiers.” They were listed on the roster with salaries but they did not exist in reality.
In brief, successive Iraqi governments had one opportunity after another to build a strong army. Even with the massive aid coming from Washington, Iraqis squandered the plethora of opportunities. The situation took a twist after the fall of Mosul. As the army was fully exposed, Iran did not stand idly by. It moved swiftly to establish Shiite militias to fight Daesh. Now between the American airstrike, the Shiite militias’ participation, and the Kurdish Peshmerga, it seems that the Iraqi army and the prime minister are losing the ground.
Against this backdrop, Al-Abadi took advantage of the report to declare a war on corruption and Al-Maliki. The impetus created by the protest movements and the support of Ali Sistani encouraged Al-Abadi to corner Al-Maliki. It is not yet clear whether Al-Abadi will launch an all-out war against Iran’s number one man in Iraq.
Casting aside the fight between Al-Abadi and Al-Maliki and the internal bickering among various Shiite forces, it is hard to believe that the Iraqi government is going to unite the Iraqis in the foreseeable future. From the get-go, Iraqi governments excluded the Sunnis from the political game thus creating a social and political rift that is difficult to bridge. Were it not for the governments’ sectarian policies and its systematic targeting of Sunnis, Daesh would not have emerged in Iraq they way it did. For Al-Abadi to rectify the situation and to lay the ground for political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunni as a prerequisite for an effective means to fight Daesh, perhaps Al-Maliki should be left to fact legal actions from civil and military courts for his role in the humiliating loss of Mosul. Any recycling of Al-Maliki would only send a message that the government — regardless of its composition — will not be the recipe for political reconciliation. Only then can Al-Abadi claim that he would put Iraq back on track.
To be sure, Al-Abadi’s fight with the embattled Al-Maliki is an uphill battle. The Islamic Da’wa party is evenly divided between Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi. It is hard to believe that Al-Abadi can win without decisively splitting the party. Therefore, Al-Abadi needs to think of various ways to diversify his options. The bottom line, and herein lies the crux of the matter, Al-Abadi will not be able to bring sanity to Iraqi politics and unite the country to fight Daesh until if builds bridges beyond his own disgruntled and divided sect.
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8/23/15
In the post-Saddam Iraq, successive Iraqi governments used every trick in the book to manipulate Iraqis and to justify their failure in effectively governing the country. Sectarian policies followed by these governments are responsible for the grim situation of Iraq.
This time, however, Iraqi Shiites have risen up and taken to the streets to express their dissatisfaction over the systematic failure of the governments to deliver on their basic needs. Not surprisingly, Iraqis have reached a point where even pro-government Iraqis could not tolerate corruption and the government’s indifference to their daily needs such as electricity especially during a very hot summer.
Iraqis are talking about tens of billions of dollars wasted during the last decade. Adding insult to injury is the report released by the parliament’s security and defense committee on the fall of Mosul to Daesh last year. The report squarely blames former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki along with senior army commanders and key ministers. If anything, the report could serve as the basis for prosecuting and perhaps indicting Al-Maliki. The report states that the army lacked preparedness just before the fall of Mosul and it turned a blind eye to Daesh’s activities in Mosul like collection of taxes. The army’s corruption in Iraq is not a news flash. It is an open secret. Indeed, upon his assumption of power in September 2014, Prime Minister Al-Abadi learned that some 50,000 soldiers are indeed “ghost soldiers.” They were listed on the roster with salaries but they did not exist in reality.
In brief, successive Iraqi governments had one opportunity after another to build a strong army. Even with the massive aid coming from Washington, Iraqis squandered the plethora of opportunities. The situation took a twist after the fall of Mosul. As the army was fully exposed, Iran did not stand idly by. It moved swiftly to establish Shiite militias to fight Daesh. Now between the American airstrike, the Shiite militias’ participation, and the Kurdish Peshmerga, it seems that the Iraqi army and the prime minister are losing the ground.
Against this backdrop, Al-Abadi took advantage of the report to declare a war on corruption and Al-Maliki. The impetus created by the protest movements and the support of Ali Sistani encouraged Al-Abadi to corner Al-Maliki. It is not yet clear whether Al-Abadi will launch an all-out war against Iran’s number one man in Iraq.
Casting aside the fight between Al-Abadi and Al-Maliki and the internal bickering among various Shiite forces, it is hard to believe that the Iraqi government is going to unite the Iraqis in the foreseeable future. From the get-go, Iraqi governments excluded the Sunnis from the political game thus creating a social and political rift that is difficult to bridge. Were it not for the governments’ sectarian policies and its systematic targeting of Sunnis, Daesh would not have emerged in Iraq they way it did. For Al-Abadi to rectify the situation and to lay the ground for political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunni as a prerequisite for an effective means to fight Daesh, perhaps Al-Maliki should be left to fact legal actions from civil and military courts for his role in the humiliating loss of Mosul. Any recycling of Al-Maliki would only send a message that the government — regardless of its composition — will not be the recipe for political reconciliation. Only then can Al-Abadi claim that he would put Iraq back on track.
To be sure, Al-Abadi’s fight with the embattled Al-Maliki is an uphill battle. The Islamic Da’wa party is evenly divided between Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi. It is hard to believe that Al-Abadi can win without decisively splitting the party. Therefore, Al-Abadi needs to think of various ways to diversify his options. The bottom line, and herein lies the crux of the matter, Al-Abadi will not be able to bring sanity to Iraqi politics and unite the country to fight Daesh until if builds bridges beyond his own disgruntled and divided sect.
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