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Iraqi political crisis as US completes pullout
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The U.S. Army cross into Kuwait as the last convoy pulls out of Iraq Dec. 18, 2011. (SHANNON STAPLETON/Reuters)
By Ben Van Heuvelen of Iraq Oil Report
Published December 18, 2011
BAGHDAD - The American military is gone. In the dark hours of Sunday morning the last U.S. troops in Iraq left Camp Adder - now known as Imam Ali Airbase - and crossed a flood-lit berm lined with barbed wire at the Kuwait border.
With the completion of the U.S. withdrawal, the rifts in Iraq's polity are widening, and the seismic tremors are coming bigger and sooner than many anticipated. Leaders are still struggling to define the basic shape of the state, and many people are reacting to the uncertainty by seeking refuge and strength in ethnic and sectarian identities.
Iraq's Sunni-dominated political bloc, Iraqiya, announced on Saturday a boycott of Parliament – threatening legislative deadlock and posing a challenge to the survival of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government.
The group, led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, has long complained that Maliki has failed to implement a November 2010 power-sharing agreement that led to the formation of the government. A statement issued by Iraqiya accused Maliki of violating the Constitution, politicizing the judiciary, and abusing his power as commander in chief of the military.
Maliki's ultimate provocation appeared to be his alleged use of security forces to intimidate fellow politicians. The Iraqiya statement accused Maliki of stationing tanks and armored cars in front of Iraqiya members' homes.
Iraq's government-aligned television station announced Saturday that Baghdad's top security agency, which reports directly to the prime minister, has issued an arrest warrant for Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a member of Iraqiya, on charges of terrorism. Hours later, another announcement said that formal charges would come after an investigation.
The same station aired another announcement saying that Maliki would call for a no-confidence vote in Saleh al-Mutlaq, one of Iraqiya's top leaders, who currently serves as a deputy prime minister. Iraqiya's boycott still leaves enough MPs in Parliament for a quorum, unless other blocs join the protest.
The open hostility between the two largest political blocs reflects the outcry on Iraq's streets.
In Diyala province northeast of Baghdad, the Sunni-majority provincial government has taken steps toward asserting autonomy from Baghdad by becoming a federated region, while the Shiite minority has resisted a move that would reduce the power of the Shiite-dominated central government.
On Friday, armed demonstrators aligned with the Shiite cleric and political leader Moqtada al-Sadr blocked highways there; on Saturday, protesters reportedly sacked the provincial council building in the capital of Baquba.
In recent weeks, Salahuddin province has also made preliminary moves towards becoming a region. Maliki responded by accusing provincial leaders of abetting Baathists, referring to the banned party of Saddam Hussein.
Maliki has also ordered the arrest of more than 600 people, overwhelmingly Sunni, on charges of colluding in a Baathist plot to overthrow the government. Those arrests relied for evidence on lists of alleged conspirators, some of whom are long deceased.
One common theme that runs through these conflicts is the unresolved question of how to distribute and administer the powers of the state.
An unfinished Iraq
As the 3rd Brigade of the Army's 1st Cavalry Division made its final "Tactical Road March" in Iraq, the troops were well aware of the volatility they were leaving behind.
Since May the U.S. military has been paying several sheikhs as much as $100,000 per month to clear old tires and piles of garbage in which would-be attackers might hide roadside bombs along its southern withdrawal route.
"When the sun comes up, we'll be across the berm," said Lt. Col. Jack Vantress told his soldiers. "Laser focus. Laser focus. You've got time, hours of road to go. There are people out there who still want to hurt you."
The base they left to Iraq reflects the unfinished nature of the state. In a handover ceremony on Friday, members of the Iraqi Air Force had given enthusiastic speeches to the cheering of their comrades; yet the only aircraft remaining at the base is a plane missing one propeller and its landing gear.
With Iraq's airspace undefended, the government has recently made efforts to purchase fighter planes from the U.S.; but Iraqi Kurds, who remember Saddam's use of air power in his campaigns of ethnic cleansing, have opposed Maliki's attempts to build an air force.
Such mistrust permeates Iraq's attempts to build the state.
Iraq's 2005 Constitution left ambiguous several key provisions and called for subsequent legislation to give structure to the country's key institutions, such as the oil sector and the judiciary. Some of that legislation has been drafted, but little has been passed.
In the absence of such laws, disagreements have grown shaper.
Leaders in Baghdad and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region have been debating for years the fundamental questions of the oil sector, including who has contracting authority, what institutions should set policy and manage operations, and how to distribute revenues. The stakes of that debate have only risen as both sides have signed oil contracts and begun developing separate oil sectors.
Most recently, ExxonMobil defied Baghdad's ban against Kurdish oil deals and signed six exploration contracts with the northern region. That move threw into question not only Exxon's future work with Baghdad in developing the super-giant West Qurna 1 field, but also the future of Kurdistan-Baghdad relations on issues ranging from the oil law to territorial disputes.
In Iraq's oil fields, its streets, and the halls of power, a great federalist debate is playing out. Maliki and his allies argue that only a strong central authority can keep the country from fracturing into a series of balkanized states; Maliki's opponents worry that too much power concentrated in the executive has already begun to lead to tyranny.
Both of these views are infused by an anxiety about the weakness of Iraq's institutions. Minorities fear the tyranny of the majority, while those in power can credibly claim that yielding their power will lead to chaos rather than democratic process.
The oil sector's undecided future
One beacon of modest hope on Saturday was a small gathering at the Al-Alwiah Club in Baghdad. Policymakers and oil experts were there to discuss the future of Iraqi oil and gas at a seminar hosted by the Iraqi Institute for Economic Reform.
One by one, Iraqi lawmakers and academics approached a lectern and shared their views on oil policy.
Thamir Ghadhban, a former oil minister and current advisor to Maliki, gave a first-hand account of the attempts to draft oil legislation over the past five years. He presented himself less as a partisan than as a mediator.
"Why are there differences? Because there are different views and different interests," he said, summarizing the challenge of the day. "One piece of legislation has to reflect these views. How do we reconcile these differences through one law?"
Wael Abdul Latif, a former parliamentarian from the southern oil hub of Basra who helped write the Iraqi Constitution in 2005, said that today's Iraq did not match the vision of the framers.
"Article 112 states that the central government, together with the regions and the oil-producing areas, should set strategic policies for the development of oil to get the highest possible share," he said. "We have not seen this kind of cooperation."
The Kurdistan region's autonomous oil development and Baghdad's management of Basra oil fields had created a double standard, he said. The resulting frustration has led the Basra leaders to file a legal challenge against the Oil Ministry's recent deal with Shell for the development of associated gas at three of the province's fields.
Many people spoke passionately, and some raised their voices to a coarse yell over the shouted objections of the audience; but the proceedings were mostly civil, and the result was an open debate in the presence of not an American occupation authority but the representatives of a sovereign Iraqi government.
The lone American in the room could optimistically imagine the proceedings as a modern-day analogue to the Constitutional Convention. The primary subject, after all, was federalism.
But even this hopeful event featured a sobering reminder of Iraq's dubious institutions.
Former parliamentarian Shatha al-Musawi spoke of her attempts to challenge the legality of Baghdad's deal with BP to develop the super-giant Rumaila field. In 2009, she filed a lawsuit as a private citizen against the contract, charging that it violated Iraqi law because it had not been ratified by Parliament.
A confident government, she argued, would have let the case proceed. But instead, Musawi said, "the court was not independent; it was subject to political interference" – and she was required to produce $250,000 to pay expenses associated with the cost of hearing the case.
Unable to raise the funds, she dropped the lawsuit. She says she will try again, if Parliament ever passes long-delayed legislation to restructure the judiciary.
"There is not any intention to build a new state, a democratic state," she said. "I am seeing that things are deteriorating. I need to do something, but I feel I am powerless."
The categorical imperative of modern Iraq is to increase production. Not only does the state take more than 90 percent of its revenues from oil sales, but its geopolitical power depends on export capacity.
Falah al-Amri, the director general of the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), recalled the days in 2003 when occupied Iraq was producing just 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd); next year, he expects Iraq to pump 3.4 million bpd; five years from now, he said, Iraq could be a swing producer like Saudi Arabia.
Yet as long as Iraq's future depends upon stop-gap political agreements rather than stable institutions, only an optimist or a politician can predict a steady rise with any confidence.
The enduring image of the day was a graph that Amri projected onto a large screen, showing Iraqi production over the past four decades. As the red line moved forward through time, it rose and fell steeply, tracing the path of a vertiginous rollercoaster.
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The U.S. Army cross into Kuwait as the last convoy pulls out of Iraq Dec. 18, 2011. (SHANNON STAPLETON/Reuters)
By Ben Van Heuvelen of Iraq Oil Report
Published December 18, 2011
BAGHDAD - The American military is gone. In the dark hours of Sunday morning the last U.S. troops in Iraq left Camp Adder - now known as Imam Ali Airbase - and crossed a flood-lit berm lined with barbed wire at the Kuwait border.
With the completion of the U.S. withdrawal, the rifts in Iraq's polity are widening, and the seismic tremors are coming bigger and sooner than many anticipated. Leaders are still struggling to define the basic shape of the state, and many people are reacting to the uncertainty by seeking refuge and strength in ethnic and sectarian identities.
Iraq's Sunni-dominated political bloc, Iraqiya, announced on Saturday a boycott of Parliament – threatening legislative deadlock and posing a challenge to the survival of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government.
The group, led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, has long complained that Maliki has failed to implement a November 2010 power-sharing agreement that led to the formation of the government. A statement issued by Iraqiya accused Maliki of violating the Constitution, politicizing the judiciary, and abusing his power as commander in chief of the military.
Maliki's ultimate provocation appeared to be his alleged use of security forces to intimidate fellow politicians. The Iraqiya statement accused Maliki of stationing tanks and armored cars in front of Iraqiya members' homes.
Iraq's government-aligned television station announced Saturday that Baghdad's top security agency, which reports directly to the prime minister, has issued an arrest warrant for Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a member of Iraqiya, on charges of terrorism. Hours later, another announcement said that formal charges would come after an investigation.
The same station aired another announcement saying that Maliki would call for a no-confidence vote in Saleh al-Mutlaq, one of Iraqiya's top leaders, who currently serves as a deputy prime minister. Iraqiya's boycott still leaves enough MPs in Parliament for a quorum, unless other blocs join the protest.
The open hostility between the two largest political blocs reflects the outcry on Iraq's streets.
In Diyala province northeast of Baghdad, the Sunni-majority provincial government has taken steps toward asserting autonomy from Baghdad by becoming a federated region, while the Shiite minority has resisted a move that would reduce the power of the Shiite-dominated central government.
On Friday, armed demonstrators aligned with the Shiite cleric and political leader Moqtada al-Sadr blocked highways there; on Saturday, protesters reportedly sacked the provincial council building in the capital of Baquba.
In recent weeks, Salahuddin province has also made preliminary moves towards becoming a region. Maliki responded by accusing provincial leaders of abetting Baathists, referring to the banned party of Saddam Hussein.
Maliki has also ordered the arrest of more than 600 people, overwhelmingly Sunni, on charges of colluding in a Baathist plot to overthrow the government. Those arrests relied for evidence on lists of alleged conspirators, some of whom are long deceased.
One common theme that runs through these conflicts is the unresolved question of how to distribute and administer the powers of the state.
An unfinished Iraq
As the 3rd Brigade of the Army's 1st Cavalry Division made its final "Tactical Road March" in Iraq, the troops were well aware of the volatility they were leaving behind.
Since May the U.S. military has been paying several sheikhs as much as $100,000 per month to clear old tires and piles of garbage in which would-be attackers might hide roadside bombs along its southern withdrawal route.
"When the sun comes up, we'll be across the berm," said Lt. Col. Jack Vantress told his soldiers. "Laser focus. Laser focus. You've got time, hours of road to go. There are people out there who still want to hurt you."
The base they left to Iraq reflects the unfinished nature of the state. In a handover ceremony on Friday, members of the Iraqi Air Force had given enthusiastic speeches to the cheering of their comrades; yet the only aircraft remaining at the base is a plane missing one propeller and its landing gear.
With Iraq's airspace undefended, the government has recently made efforts to purchase fighter planes from the U.S.; but Iraqi Kurds, who remember Saddam's use of air power in his campaigns of ethnic cleansing, have opposed Maliki's attempts to build an air force.
Such mistrust permeates Iraq's attempts to build the state.
Iraq's 2005 Constitution left ambiguous several key provisions and called for subsequent legislation to give structure to the country's key institutions, such as the oil sector and the judiciary. Some of that legislation has been drafted, but little has been passed.
In the absence of such laws, disagreements have grown shaper.
Leaders in Baghdad and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region have been debating for years the fundamental questions of the oil sector, including who has contracting authority, what institutions should set policy and manage operations, and how to distribute revenues. The stakes of that debate have only risen as both sides have signed oil contracts and begun developing separate oil sectors.
Most recently, ExxonMobil defied Baghdad's ban against Kurdish oil deals and signed six exploration contracts with the northern region. That move threw into question not only Exxon's future work with Baghdad in developing the super-giant West Qurna 1 field, but also the future of Kurdistan-Baghdad relations on issues ranging from the oil law to territorial disputes.
In Iraq's oil fields, its streets, and the halls of power, a great federalist debate is playing out. Maliki and his allies argue that only a strong central authority can keep the country from fracturing into a series of balkanized states; Maliki's opponents worry that too much power concentrated in the executive has already begun to lead to tyranny.
Both of these views are infused by an anxiety about the weakness of Iraq's institutions. Minorities fear the tyranny of the majority, while those in power can credibly claim that yielding their power will lead to chaos rather than democratic process.
The oil sector's undecided future
One beacon of modest hope on Saturday was a small gathering at the Al-Alwiah Club in Baghdad. Policymakers and oil experts were there to discuss the future of Iraqi oil and gas at a seminar hosted by the Iraqi Institute for Economic Reform.
One by one, Iraqi lawmakers and academics approached a lectern and shared their views on oil policy.
Thamir Ghadhban, a former oil minister and current advisor to Maliki, gave a first-hand account of the attempts to draft oil legislation over the past five years. He presented himself less as a partisan than as a mediator.
"Why are there differences? Because there are different views and different interests," he said, summarizing the challenge of the day. "One piece of legislation has to reflect these views. How do we reconcile these differences through one law?"
Wael Abdul Latif, a former parliamentarian from the southern oil hub of Basra who helped write the Iraqi Constitution in 2005, said that today's Iraq did not match the vision of the framers.
"Article 112 states that the central government, together with the regions and the oil-producing areas, should set strategic policies for the development of oil to get the highest possible share," he said. "We have not seen this kind of cooperation."
The Kurdistan region's autonomous oil development and Baghdad's management of Basra oil fields had created a double standard, he said. The resulting frustration has led the Basra leaders to file a legal challenge against the Oil Ministry's recent deal with Shell for the development of associated gas at three of the province's fields.
Many people spoke passionately, and some raised their voices to a coarse yell over the shouted objections of the audience; but the proceedings were mostly civil, and the result was an open debate in the presence of not an American occupation authority but the representatives of a sovereign Iraqi government.
The lone American in the room could optimistically imagine the proceedings as a modern-day analogue to the Constitutional Convention. The primary subject, after all, was federalism.
But even this hopeful event featured a sobering reminder of Iraq's dubious institutions.
Former parliamentarian Shatha al-Musawi spoke of her attempts to challenge the legality of Baghdad's deal with BP to develop the super-giant Rumaila field. In 2009, she filed a lawsuit as a private citizen against the contract, charging that it violated Iraqi law because it had not been ratified by Parliament.
A confident government, she argued, would have let the case proceed. But instead, Musawi said, "the court was not independent; it was subject to political interference" – and she was required to produce $250,000 to pay expenses associated with the cost of hearing the case.
Unable to raise the funds, she dropped the lawsuit. She says she will try again, if Parliament ever passes long-delayed legislation to restructure the judiciary.
"There is not any intention to build a new state, a democratic state," she said. "I am seeing that things are deteriorating. I need to do something, but I feel I am powerless."
The categorical imperative of modern Iraq is to increase production. Not only does the state take more than 90 percent of its revenues from oil sales, but its geopolitical power depends on export capacity.
Falah al-Amri, the director general of the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), recalled the days in 2003 when occupied Iraq was producing just 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd); next year, he expects Iraq to pump 3.4 million bpd; five years from now, he said, Iraq could be a swing producer like Saudi Arabia.
Yet as long as Iraq's future depends upon stop-gap political agreements rather than stable institutions, only an optimist or a politician can predict a steady rise with any confidence.
The enduring image of the day was a graph that Amri projected onto a large screen, showing Iraqi production over the past four decades. As the red line moved forward through time, it rose and fell steeply, tracing the path of a vertiginous rollercoaster.
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