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American specialist on the Middle East reveals the top 10 mistakes made by al-Maliki
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Thursday 0.21 August 0.2014
Occur blogger and professor of American history interested in Middle Eastern affairs Juan Cole in an article on his blog about the top 10 mistakes made by the Iraqi Prime Minister outgoing Nuri al-Maliki in two his two terms (2006-2010) and (2010-2014) and their impact on the case of Iraq now .. It is also said analyst:
1.-Maliki was partisan militants in 2006 when he took office and did not deny that the Shiite militias they represent a security problem. When Gen. David Petraeus came to him in late 2006 with a plan to disarm militias, Sunni and Shia in Baghdad, al-Maliki insisted start Sunni armed groups.
acquiesced and the United States was the result of ethnic cleansing of the Sunnis later. The proportion of Sunnis in Baghdad from 45% in 2003 to only 25% by the end of 2007 led to the transformation of sectarian Maliki Baghdad to the Shiite city to a large extent.
2. Gen. Petraeus planting collaborators from the Sunnis worried about the escalation of the base (the parent organization of Daash now) in Iraq and founded the "Awakening" of Sunni insurgents who are willing to fight the extremists. And the land of al-Maliki, fearing that this program represent a problem for the Shiite government after the defeat of al-Qaeda. When the American forces withdrew in 2009, the United States asked al-Maliki employ about 100 thousand fighters of the Awakening Councils to integrate them into the possibility of police in cities such as Fallujah or Mosul. Ein al-Maliki, 17 thousand of them and leave the others in the wind, without any salaries or pensions. Some of them are presented for slaughter at the hands of al-Qaeda terrorists in retaliation or for trial before the courts for alleged anti-Maliki government before joining the Awakening. Deny al-Maliki for nearly 1.6 million (out of about 5 million at the time) of Sunni Arabs.
3 Although the prime minister's crackdown in Basra against the Mahdi Army in the spring of 2008 ended with the victory of the new Iraqi army, it was only due to join the Badr Corps pro-Iranian army, and because of the American air support. Army and ended Maliki imbued sympathetically Shiite, and this is what made him unwelcome in Mosul, a predominantly Sunni (2 million Sunni) but this alliance with Mosalion "Daash" against al-Maliki.
4. reports indicate that al-Maliki kept the army weak, fear of the strong officer coup against him.
5. Habi-Maliki Shia south who represent his power base, and neglected to provide basic services to the Sunni Arab cities, including adequate electricity.
6. in late 2011, Maliki announced suddenly that the Sunni vice president Tariq al-Hashemi, a terrorist, without any due process, has led to the decision alienated much of the year.
7-Maliki budgets suffered from inflation, and did not bother to invest, or create jobs, or to support local industry, or to diversify the economy away from dependence on oil almost complete.
8. In 2010, when he joined the year with enthusiasm for the political process and voted in droves for the Iraqi party, frozen by al-Maliki out of power in favor of the Shiite coalition is under pressure from Shiite Iran.
9 when he broke out of the Arab Spring in early 2011 had echoes of a protest against Maliki's Shi'ite and Sunni alike, and Maliki has vowed not to run for a third term as prime minister and reneged on the Covenant, but resigned under pressure after leaving the Sunnis in the arms of the "Islamic State (Daash ").
10.-Maliki brutally suppress demonstrations in 2013 the Sunnis in places like Fallujah and Hawija.
The writer that Sunni Arabs make sure absolutely that weaken Maliki influence in Parliament would deny them any political tactic, Fathaverwawa arms, pointing out that more than anything losing Maliki is not fit for the Sunni Arabs and carry them to resort to arms Daash policies of the methodology in the marginalized, and Pat Hope currently pinned to integrate the Sunnis in the political track to save what is left of Iraq.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
Writings
Thursday 0.21 August 0.2014
Occur blogger and professor of American history interested in Middle Eastern affairs Juan Cole in an article on his blog about the top 10 mistakes made by the Iraqi Prime Minister outgoing Nuri al-Maliki in two his two terms (2006-2010) and (2010-2014) and their impact on the case of Iraq now .. It is also said analyst:
1.-Maliki was partisan militants in 2006 when he took office and did not deny that the Shiite militias they represent a security problem. When Gen. David Petraeus came to him in late 2006 with a plan to disarm militias, Sunni and Shia in Baghdad, al-Maliki insisted start Sunni armed groups.
acquiesced and the United States was the result of ethnic cleansing of the Sunnis later. The proportion of Sunnis in Baghdad from 45% in 2003 to only 25% by the end of 2007 led to the transformation of sectarian Maliki Baghdad to the Shiite city to a large extent.
2. Gen. Petraeus planting collaborators from the Sunnis worried about the escalation of the base (the parent organization of Daash now) in Iraq and founded the "Awakening" of Sunni insurgents who are willing to fight the extremists. And the land of al-Maliki, fearing that this program represent a problem for the Shiite government after the defeat of al-Qaeda. When the American forces withdrew in 2009, the United States asked al-Maliki employ about 100 thousand fighters of the Awakening Councils to integrate them into the possibility of police in cities such as Fallujah or Mosul. Ein al-Maliki, 17 thousand of them and leave the others in the wind, without any salaries or pensions. Some of them are presented for slaughter at the hands of al-Qaeda terrorists in retaliation or for trial before the courts for alleged anti-Maliki government before joining the Awakening. Deny al-Maliki for nearly 1.6 million (out of about 5 million at the time) of Sunni Arabs.
3 Although the prime minister's crackdown in Basra against the Mahdi Army in the spring of 2008 ended with the victory of the new Iraqi army, it was only due to join the Badr Corps pro-Iranian army, and because of the American air support. Army and ended Maliki imbued sympathetically Shiite, and this is what made him unwelcome in Mosul, a predominantly Sunni (2 million Sunni) but this alliance with Mosalion "Daash" against al-Maliki.
4. reports indicate that al-Maliki kept the army weak, fear of the strong officer coup against him.
5. Habi-Maliki Shia south who represent his power base, and neglected to provide basic services to the Sunni Arab cities, including adequate electricity.
6. in late 2011, Maliki announced suddenly that the Sunni vice president Tariq al-Hashemi, a terrorist, without any due process, has led to the decision alienated much of the year.
7-Maliki budgets suffered from inflation, and did not bother to invest, or create jobs, or to support local industry, or to diversify the economy away from dependence on oil almost complete.
8. In 2010, when he joined the year with enthusiasm for the political process and voted in droves for the Iraqi party, frozen by al-Maliki out of power in favor of the Shiite coalition is under pressure from Shiite Iran.
9 when he broke out of the Arab Spring in early 2011 had echoes of a protest against Maliki's Shi'ite and Sunni alike, and Maliki has vowed not to run for a third term as prime minister and reneged on the Covenant, but resigned under pressure after leaving the Sunnis in the arms of the "Islamic State (Daash ").
10.-Maliki brutally suppress demonstrations in 2013 the Sunnis in places like Fallujah and Hawija.
The writer that Sunni Arabs make sure absolutely that weaken Maliki influence in Parliament would deny them any political tactic, Fathaverwawa arms, pointing out that more than anything losing Maliki is not fit for the Sunni Arabs and carry them to resort to arms Daash policies of the methodology in the marginalized, and Pat Hope currently pinned to integrate the Sunnis in the political track to save what is left of Iraq.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
