Iraq must unite to overcome ISIS
2/12/2015
When the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) seized control of huge swathes of Iraq last summer, it was hoped that this grave threat to the country's security might lead to Iraq's sectarian tensions being put aside, at least temporarily. It was not so. As Iraq's second city of Mosul fell to militants and Iraqi soldiers fled their posts in the face of the ISIS onslaught, parliament remained in a post-election deadlock, unable to agree a government even during such a pressing crisis. Some commentators spoke of the break-up of Iraq into Kurdish, Shia and Sunni regions as the most likely outcome.
Now, months later, the immediate political deadlock is a thing of the past, but the same problems are rumbling on, and are impacting the fight against ISIS. The latest disagreement is over the make-up of a new Sunni fighting force, the National Guard.
The US has repeatedly advocated the establishment of such a force, which would be an alternative to the regular Shia-dominated military and would be answerable to the provincial governments in the north and west of Iraq, and then to the prime minister. It is hoped that such a force would empower Sunni communities, who distrust the army and national police, accusing them of persecuting their communities with indiscriminate arrests.
After dictator Saddam Hussein was removed from power in 2003 and Shia majority rule was restored, Sunnis have claimed that they have been unfairly victimised with anti-terror laws and by the ban on former members of Saddam's Baath Party participating in politics.
The need for a force like the National Guard is clearly pressing. Large sections of the Sunni-dominated provinces in the west and north of the country, including Mosul have been seized by ISIS. The deep distrust between local Sunni populations and the Iraqi army means that there is very poor communication and coordination in these areas.
Local Shia militias are supported by the government, as is the Kurdish peshmerga, but the Sunni population is underrepresented on the frontline. These Shia and Kurdish forces view Sunnis with suspicion, as they belong to the same religious sect as ISIS fighters. There are risks of this creating a vicious cycle: a generalised response against all Sunnis by Kurds and Shias will surely lead to more Sunnis being radicalised. The National Guard was planned to emulate the Sahwa troops of Sunni fighters established by the US in 2006 to fight Al-Qaeda.
But, according to Iraqi parliamentarians, disagreements between political factions mean that plans for the National Guard are likely to be delayed or cancelled. Sunni political and tribal leaders have painted the law as a way for their communities to take charge of their own security in battling ISIS. But some Sunni MPs have told the media that other MPs, acting on sectarian motives, are attempting to derail the plans so that they can retain their domination of the security forces.
A second law, which would end the ban on former Baath Party members taking part in public life, has also faltered. Sunni MPs do not believe it would go far enough. According to an Al-Jazeera report, some Kurdish and Shia lawmakers are afraid that the formation of the National Guard could be the beginning of a larger Sunni insurgent force that could threaten Shia provinces and the Kurdish region. There is reportedly some concern that this could lead to the formation of a separate Sunni region after ISIS is driven out.
Clearly, it is a difficult balancing act for the government in Iraq, with meaningful progress hampered by mutual suspicion on all sides. Fears about the break-up of the country are nothing new. The country is riven by sectarian divisions, which were exploited and exacerbated by Saddam as a way to cement his power. The scars of the bitter sectarian civil war that followed the US invasion are still strongly present in the national consciousness.
Any partition of the country would result in fighting over natural resources like oil and the control of mixed areas like Kirkuk. It would likely result in a huge loss of life and influx of refugees. It is not a solution that most people would like to see, but if it is to be avoided, it is clearly of paramount importance that Sunnis are brought into the political process in a more meaningful way, and that communities attempt to work together against the common threat of ISIS – both at the frontline, and in the halls of power.
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2/12/2015
When the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) seized control of huge swathes of Iraq last summer, it was hoped that this grave threat to the country's security might lead to Iraq's sectarian tensions being put aside, at least temporarily. It was not so. As Iraq's second city of Mosul fell to militants and Iraqi soldiers fled their posts in the face of the ISIS onslaught, parliament remained in a post-election deadlock, unable to agree a government even during such a pressing crisis. Some commentators spoke of the break-up of Iraq into Kurdish, Shia and Sunni regions as the most likely outcome.
Now, months later, the immediate political deadlock is a thing of the past, but the same problems are rumbling on, and are impacting the fight against ISIS. The latest disagreement is over the make-up of a new Sunni fighting force, the National Guard.
The US has repeatedly advocated the establishment of such a force, which would be an alternative to the regular Shia-dominated military and would be answerable to the provincial governments in the north and west of Iraq, and then to the prime minister. It is hoped that such a force would empower Sunni communities, who distrust the army and national police, accusing them of persecuting their communities with indiscriminate arrests.
After dictator Saddam Hussein was removed from power in 2003 and Shia majority rule was restored, Sunnis have claimed that they have been unfairly victimised with anti-terror laws and by the ban on former members of Saddam's Baath Party participating in politics.
The need for a force like the National Guard is clearly pressing. Large sections of the Sunni-dominated provinces in the west and north of the country, including Mosul have been seized by ISIS. The deep distrust between local Sunni populations and the Iraqi army means that there is very poor communication and coordination in these areas.
Local Shia militias are supported by the government, as is the Kurdish peshmerga, but the Sunni population is underrepresented on the frontline. These Shia and Kurdish forces view Sunnis with suspicion, as they belong to the same religious sect as ISIS fighters. There are risks of this creating a vicious cycle: a generalised response against all Sunnis by Kurds and Shias will surely lead to more Sunnis being radicalised. The National Guard was planned to emulate the Sahwa troops of Sunni fighters established by the US in 2006 to fight Al-Qaeda.
But, according to Iraqi parliamentarians, disagreements between political factions mean that plans for the National Guard are likely to be delayed or cancelled. Sunni political and tribal leaders have painted the law as a way for their communities to take charge of their own security in battling ISIS. But some Sunni MPs have told the media that other MPs, acting on sectarian motives, are attempting to derail the plans so that they can retain their domination of the security forces.
A second law, which would end the ban on former Baath Party members taking part in public life, has also faltered. Sunni MPs do not believe it would go far enough. According to an Al-Jazeera report, some Kurdish and Shia lawmakers are afraid that the formation of the National Guard could be the beginning of a larger Sunni insurgent force that could threaten Shia provinces and the Kurdish region. There is reportedly some concern that this could lead to the formation of a separate Sunni region after ISIS is driven out.
Clearly, it is a difficult balancing act for the government in Iraq, with meaningful progress hampered by mutual suspicion on all sides. Fears about the break-up of the country are nothing new. The country is riven by sectarian divisions, which were exploited and exacerbated by Saddam as a way to cement his power. The scars of the bitter sectarian civil war that followed the US invasion are still strongly present in the national consciousness.
Any partition of the country would result in fighting over natural resources like oil and the control of mixed areas like Kirkuk. It would likely result in a huge loss of life and influx of refugees. It is not a solution that most people would like to see, but if it is to be avoided, it is clearly of paramount importance that Sunnis are brought into the political process in a more meaningful way, and that communities attempt to work together against the common threat of ISIS – both at the frontline, and in the halls of power.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]