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IMF Executive Board Concludes 2013 Article IV Consultation with Iraq
Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 13/58
May 21, 2013
Public Information Notices (PINs) form part of the IMF's efforts to promote transparency of the IMF's views and analysis of economic developments and policies. With the consent of the country (or countries) concerned, PINs are issued after Executive Board discussions of Article IV consultations with member countries, of its surveillance of developments at the regional level, of post-program monitoring, and of ex post assessments of member countries with longer-term program engagements. PINs are also issued after Executive Board discussions of general policy matters, unless otherwise decided by the Executive Board in a particular case.
On May 13, 2013, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Iraq.1
Background
Iraq is exceptionally rich in oil, but its economy suffers from severe structural weaknesses, such as a small non-oil sector, a dominating role of the government in all areas of the economy, and a poor business environment. Nevertheless, partly thanks to the increase in oil production since 2003, Iraq has achieved a rise in GDP per capita from $1,300 in 2004 to $6,300 in 2012 in a very difficult security and political context. During this period, Fund program engagement with Iraq was instrumental in maintaining macroeconomic stability—even though progress on structural reforms and job creation was mixed.
Recent macroeconomic developments have been broadly positive. Economic growth has reached 8.4 percent in 2012 and is expected to rise to 9 percent in 2013 as oil production increases to 3.3 million barrels per day (mbpd). Inflation has declined from about 6 percent at end-2011 to 3.6 percent at the end of last year, and should increase only slightly in 2013. International reserves of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) rose from $61 billion at end-2011 to $70 billion at end-2012, and fiscal reserves held at the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) have increased from $16.5 billion to $18 billion.
Thanks to higher-than-expected oil revenues and the under-execution of the investment budget, fiscal surpluses reached almost 5 percent of GDP in 2011 and 4 percent in 2012. However, with a break-even oil price of about $100, fiscal performance is very vulnerable to oil revenue shocks—either from oil price declines or export shortfalls. Furthermore, fiscal discipline weakened over the past two years, with poor budget planning and execution, large off-budget spending, and low investment execution rates. The 2013 budget includes large unfunded commitments, increasing fiscal risks, including the possible depletion of fiscal reserves, if the budget were to be fully executed.
The policy of a de facto peg to the U.S. dollar provides a key nominal anchor to the economy, and the nominal exchange rate in the official market has remained stable since 2010. However, since late 2011, the authorities enforced existing exchange restrictions and introduced new restrictions in response to concerns about money laundering and illegal foreign exchange outflows related to the increased demand for foreign exchange. As a result, the spread between the official rate and the parallel market rate—which had been up to that point below 2 percent—started to climb, passing 9 percent in May 2013.
Over the medium term, Iraq’s macroeconomic outlook will continue to be driven by developments in the oil sector. Staff projects that oil production will rise gradually by about 400-500 thousand barrels per day per year, reaching 5.7 mbpd by 2018. Overall, growth is projected to remain above 8 percent and inflation at 5–6 percent over the medium term.
Risks to the macroeconomic outlook remain high. They include (a) weak policy implementation, particularly in the fiscal area; (b) further deterioration of the political and security situation; (c) a larger-than-projected decline in global oil prices; and (d) delays in developing Iraq’s oil fields and oil export capacity, possibly due to security issues but also insufficient investment in oil infrastructure. These risks can translate into lower oil revenues, deterioration in the fiscal position, pressures to use CBI reserves for fiscal purposes, and higher inflation.
Executive Board Assessment
Executive Directors commended the authorities for maintaining macroeconomic stability in a difficult security and political environment. With risks remaining high, including from oil price volatility, they stressed the need to build fiscal buffers and further strengthen the institutional framework. They urged the authorities to step up reforms to develop the private non oil sector to help generate employment and inclusive growth.
Directors emphasized the need to implement sustainable fiscal policies and address risks from oil revenue volatility. Rationalizing current spending—including public employment, energy subsidies, the Public Distribution System, and transfers to state owned enterprises—is needed to create space for priority social spending and public investment and to accumulate buffers. Enhancing public financial management and avoiding quasi fiscal operations by the state owned banks are also crucial. Directors noted that fiscal rules could provide a framework for fiscal policy over the medium term.
Directors supported the objective of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) to liberalize the foreign exchange market and the recent steps to simplify market regulations. Further measures are needed to liberalize fully the supply of foreign currency, with the objective of lowering the exchange rate spread, removing distortions, and complying with Article VIII of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement. Directors considered that strengthening the Anti Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework, in line with the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA FATF) recommendations and FATF standards, would be more effective than restricting foreign exchange in curbing money laundering and terrorist financing.
Directors agreed that a stable exchange rate, supported by a high level of international reserves, provides a valuable anchor in an uncertain environment. They agreed that the two tier architecture of prudent management of CBI reserves and use of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) as a de facto oil stabilization fund is appropriate. They urged the authorities to continue to rely on the DFI to help stabilize government spending and ensure oil revenue transparency.
Directors highlighted the importance of a stable financial sector in developing the private sector and diversifying the economy, and were encouraged by recent progress in strengthening banking supervision and restructuring the Rasheed and Rafidain banks. They encouraged the authorities to ensure a level playing field for public and private banks by opening to private banks access to government business.
More broadly, Directors emphasized that fostering growth in the private non oil sector requires improving the business environment, investing in infrastructure and social capital, reforming state owned enterprises, and enhancing public service delivery. Judicious use of the country’s oil wealth can help address these pressing challenges. Improving the authorities’ capacity to implement reforms will also be critical.
Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2010–2013
(Quota: SDR 1188.4 million)
(Population: 31.7 million; 2010)
(Poverty rate: 22.9 percent; 2007)
(Main exports: Crude oil)
2010 2011 2012 2013
Actual Actual Prel. Proj.
Economic Growth and Prices
Real GDP (percentage change)
5.9 8.6 8.4 9.0
Non-oil real GDP (percentage change)
9.7 5.7 6.3 6.0
GDP per capita (US$)
4,278 5,529 6,305 6,708
GDP (in US$ billions)
135.5 180.6 212.5 233.3
Oil production (mbpd)
2.38 2.65 2.95 3.33
Oil exports (mbpd)
1.91 2.17 2.42 2.70
Iraq oil export prices (US$ per barrel)
74.2 103.6 106.7 102.6
Consumer price inflation (percentage change; end of period)
3.3 6.0 3.6 5.0
Consumer price inflation (percentage change; average)
2.4 5.6 6.1 4.3
Core price inflation (percentage change; end of period)
3.3 7.0 4.2 5.0
(In percent of GDP)
National Accounts
Gross domestic investment
21.4 19.3 20.3 21.1
Of which: public
15.2 13.0 13.5 14.7
Gross domestic consumption
77.9 66.9 70.8 73.2
Of which: public
25.2 21.7 21.3 21.6
Gross national savings
24.4 31.8 27.3 24.9
Of which: public
10.8 17.7 18.1 17.1
Saving – Investment balance
3.0 12.5 7.0 3.8
(In percent of GDP; unless otherwise indicated)
Public Finance
Government revenue and grants
46.4 49.5 48.2 46.4
Government oil revenue
40.0 46.0 44.6 44.4
Government non-oil revenue
3.5 2.5 4.1 2.0
Grants
2.9 1.0 0.0 0.0
Expenditure, of which:
50.7 44.6 44.1 44.8
Current expenditure
35.5 31.6 30.6 30.1
Capital expenditure
15.2 13.0 13.5 14.7
Primary fiscal balance
-3.8 5.6 4.5 2.3
Overall fiscal balance (including grants)
-4.3 4.9 4.1 1.6
Non-oil primary fiscal balance (percent of non-oil GDP)
-76.0 -84.6 -73.1 -73.6
Memorandum items:
Tax revenue/non-oil GDP (in percent)
1.8 1.9 2.3 2.0
Development Fund of Iraq (in US$ billions; end of period)1
7.4 16.5 18.1 18.9
Total government debt (in US$ billions; end of period)2
70.8 73.4 74.1 40.4
o/w external debt (in US$ billions; end of period)
60.9 61.0 60.2 27.8
(In percent; unless otherwise indicated)
Monetary indicators
Growth in reserve money
15.2 9.9 9.2 7.7
Growth in broad money
14.8 38.0 4.1 13.8
Policy interest rate (end of period)
6.0 6.0 6.0
(In percent of GDP; unless otherwise indicated)
External sector
Current account
3.0 12.5 7.0 3.8
Trade balance
6.6 18.8 14.8 12.4
Exports of goods
37.9 44.1 44.3 43.5
Imports of Goods
-31.3 -25.3 -29.5 -31.1
Overall external balance
1.7 10.5 5.1 4.6
Gross reserves (in US$ billions)
50.6 61.1 70.3 80.1
In months oil imports of goods and services
10.6 9.5 9.3 9.7
Exchange rate (dinar per US$; period average)
1,170 1,170 1,166 -.-
Real effective exchange rate (percent change)
1.3 4.7 5.7 -.-
Sources: Iraqi authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
1 Excluding escrow account held abroad to purchase military equipment.
2 Assumes a debt reduction in 2013 by non-Paris Club official creditors, comparable to the Paris Club agreement.
1 Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
IMF COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
Public Affairs Media Relations
E-mail: publicaffairs@imf.org E-mail: media@imf.org
Fax: 202-623-6220 Phone: 202-623-7100
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 13/58
May 21, 2013
Public Information Notices (PINs) form part of the IMF's efforts to promote transparency of the IMF's views and analysis of economic developments and policies. With the consent of the country (or countries) concerned, PINs are issued after Executive Board discussions of Article IV consultations with member countries, of its surveillance of developments at the regional level, of post-program monitoring, and of ex post assessments of member countries with longer-term program engagements. PINs are also issued after Executive Board discussions of general policy matters, unless otherwise decided by the Executive Board in a particular case.
On May 13, 2013, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Iraq.1
Background
Iraq is exceptionally rich in oil, but its economy suffers from severe structural weaknesses, such as a small non-oil sector, a dominating role of the government in all areas of the economy, and a poor business environment. Nevertheless, partly thanks to the increase in oil production since 2003, Iraq has achieved a rise in GDP per capita from $1,300 in 2004 to $6,300 in 2012 in a very difficult security and political context. During this period, Fund program engagement with Iraq was instrumental in maintaining macroeconomic stability—even though progress on structural reforms and job creation was mixed.
Recent macroeconomic developments have been broadly positive. Economic growth has reached 8.4 percent in 2012 and is expected to rise to 9 percent in 2013 as oil production increases to 3.3 million barrels per day (mbpd). Inflation has declined from about 6 percent at end-2011 to 3.6 percent at the end of last year, and should increase only slightly in 2013. International reserves of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) rose from $61 billion at end-2011 to $70 billion at end-2012, and fiscal reserves held at the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) have increased from $16.5 billion to $18 billion.
Thanks to higher-than-expected oil revenues and the under-execution of the investment budget, fiscal surpluses reached almost 5 percent of GDP in 2011 and 4 percent in 2012. However, with a break-even oil price of about $100, fiscal performance is very vulnerable to oil revenue shocks—either from oil price declines or export shortfalls. Furthermore, fiscal discipline weakened over the past two years, with poor budget planning and execution, large off-budget spending, and low investment execution rates. The 2013 budget includes large unfunded commitments, increasing fiscal risks, including the possible depletion of fiscal reserves, if the budget were to be fully executed.
The policy of a de facto peg to the U.S. dollar provides a key nominal anchor to the economy, and the nominal exchange rate in the official market has remained stable since 2010. However, since late 2011, the authorities enforced existing exchange restrictions and introduced new restrictions in response to concerns about money laundering and illegal foreign exchange outflows related to the increased demand for foreign exchange. As a result, the spread between the official rate and the parallel market rate—which had been up to that point below 2 percent—started to climb, passing 9 percent in May 2013.
Over the medium term, Iraq’s macroeconomic outlook will continue to be driven by developments in the oil sector. Staff projects that oil production will rise gradually by about 400-500 thousand barrels per day per year, reaching 5.7 mbpd by 2018. Overall, growth is projected to remain above 8 percent and inflation at 5–6 percent over the medium term.
Risks to the macroeconomic outlook remain high. They include (a) weak policy implementation, particularly in the fiscal area; (b) further deterioration of the political and security situation; (c) a larger-than-projected decline in global oil prices; and (d) delays in developing Iraq’s oil fields and oil export capacity, possibly due to security issues but also insufficient investment in oil infrastructure. These risks can translate into lower oil revenues, deterioration in the fiscal position, pressures to use CBI reserves for fiscal purposes, and higher inflation.
Executive Board Assessment
Executive Directors commended the authorities for maintaining macroeconomic stability in a difficult security and political environment. With risks remaining high, including from oil price volatility, they stressed the need to build fiscal buffers and further strengthen the institutional framework. They urged the authorities to step up reforms to develop the private non oil sector to help generate employment and inclusive growth.
Directors emphasized the need to implement sustainable fiscal policies and address risks from oil revenue volatility. Rationalizing current spending—including public employment, energy subsidies, the Public Distribution System, and transfers to state owned enterprises—is needed to create space for priority social spending and public investment and to accumulate buffers. Enhancing public financial management and avoiding quasi fiscal operations by the state owned banks are also crucial. Directors noted that fiscal rules could provide a framework for fiscal policy over the medium term.
Directors supported the objective of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) to liberalize the foreign exchange market and the recent steps to simplify market regulations. Further measures are needed to liberalize fully the supply of foreign currency, with the objective of lowering the exchange rate spread, removing distortions, and complying with Article VIII of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement. Directors considered that strengthening the Anti Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework, in line with the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA FATF) recommendations and FATF standards, would be more effective than restricting foreign exchange in curbing money laundering and terrorist financing.
Directors agreed that a stable exchange rate, supported by a high level of international reserves, provides a valuable anchor in an uncertain environment. They agreed that the two tier architecture of prudent management of CBI reserves and use of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) as a de facto oil stabilization fund is appropriate. They urged the authorities to continue to rely on the DFI to help stabilize government spending and ensure oil revenue transparency.
Directors highlighted the importance of a stable financial sector in developing the private sector and diversifying the economy, and were encouraged by recent progress in strengthening banking supervision and restructuring the Rasheed and Rafidain banks. They encouraged the authorities to ensure a level playing field for public and private banks by opening to private banks access to government business.
More broadly, Directors emphasized that fostering growth in the private non oil sector requires improving the business environment, investing in infrastructure and social capital, reforming state owned enterprises, and enhancing public service delivery. Judicious use of the country’s oil wealth can help address these pressing challenges. Improving the authorities’ capacity to implement reforms will also be critical.
Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2010–2013
(Quota: SDR 1188.4 million)
(Population: 31.7 million; 2010)
(Poverty rate: 22.9 percent; 2007)
(Main exports: Crude oil)
2010 2011 2012 2013
Actual Actual Prel. Proj.
Economic Growth and Prices
Real GDP (percentage change)
5.9 8.6 8.4 9.0
Non-oil real GDP (percentage change)
9.7 5.7 6.3 6.0
GDP per capita (US$)
4,278 5,529 6,305 6,708
GDP (in US$ billions)
135.5 180.6 212.5 233.3
Oil production (mbpd)
2.38 2.65 2.95 3.33
Oil exports (mbpd)
1.91 2.17 2.42 2.70
Iraq oil export prices (US$ per barrel)
74.2 103.6 106.7 102.6
Consumer price inflation (percentage change; end of period)
3.3 6.0 3.6 5.0
Consumer price inflation (percentage change; average)
2.4 5.6 6.1 4.3
Core price inflation (percentage change; end of period)
3.3 7.0 4.2 5.0
(In percent of GDP)
National Accounts
Gross domestic investment
21.4 19.3 20.3 21.1
Of which: public
15.2 13.0 13.5 14.7
Gross domestic consumption
77.9 66.9 70.8 73.2
Of which: public
25.2 21.7 21.3 21.6
Gross national savings
24.4 31.8 27.3 24.9
Of which: public
10.8 17.7 18.1 17.1
Saving – Investment balance
3.0 12.5 7.0 3.8
(In percent of GDP; unless otherwise indicated)
Public Finance
Government revenue and grants
46.4 49.5 48.2 46.4
Government oil revenue
40.0 46.0 44.6 44.4
Government non-oil revenue
3.5 2.5 4.1 2.0
Grants
2.9 1.0 0.0 0.0
Expenditure, of which:
50.7 44.6 44.1 44.8
Current expenditure
35.5 31.6 30.6 30.1
Capital expenditure
15.2 13.0 13.5 14.7
Primary fiscal balance
-3.8 5.6 4.5 2.3
Overall fiscal balance (including grants)
-4.3 4.9 4.1 1.6
Non-oil primary fiscal balance (percent of non-oil GDP)
-76.0 -84.6 -73.1 -73.6
Memorandum items:
Tax revenue/non-oil GDP (in percent)
1.8 1.9 2.3 2.0
Development Fund of Iraq (in US$ billions; end of period)1
7.4 16.5 18.1 18.9
Total government debt (in US$ billions; end of period)2
70.8 73.4 74.1 40.4
o/w external debt (in US$ billions; end of period)
60.9 61.0 60.2 27.8
(In percent; unless otherwise indicated)
Monetary indicators
Growth in reserve money
15.2 9.9 9.2 7.7
Growth in broad money
14.8 38.0 4.1 13.8
Policy interest rate (end of period)
6.0 6.0 6.0
(In percent of GDP; unless otherwise indicated)
External sector
Current account
3.0 12.5 7.0 3.8
Trade balance
6.6 18.8 14.8 12.4
Exports of goods
37.9 44.1 44.3 43.5
Imports of Goods
-31.3 -25.3 -29.5 -31.1
Overall external balance
1.7 10.5 5.1 4.6
Gross reserves (in US$ billions)
50.6 61.1 70.3 80.1
In months oil imports of goods and services
10.6 9.5 9.3 9.7
Exchange rate (dinar per US$; period average)
1,170 1,170 1,166 -.-
Real effective exchange rate (percent change)
1.3 4.7 5.7 -.-
Sources: Iraqi authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
1 Excluding escrow account held abroad to purchase military equipment.
2 Assumes a debt reduction in 2013 by non-Paris Club official creditors, comparable to the Paris Club agreement.
1 Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
IMF COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
Public Affairs Media Relations
E-mail: publicaffairs@imf.org E-mail: media@imf.org
Fax: 202-623-6220 Phone: 202-623-7100
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
