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An Ambiguous Nuclear Deal with Iran
Thursday, 16 July, 2015
With the ink hardly dry on the Iran nuclear deal and the agreement still awaiting ratification, a cacophony of supportive and critical voices are already reacting. On the supportive side, American democrats, Iranian moderates and the usual voices in favor of conflict resolution above all sing the agreement’s praises. On the other side, an unlikely constellation of Israeli leaders, Iranian hardliners, Arab monarchs and American conservatives inveigh against the deal.
Even without knowing anything else about the deal, this would probably be a good sign that the final compromise was just that – a give and take that captured a fiendishly difficult to establish “zone of agreement” that both sides could sign on to, but that neither is completely happy with. Anything that favored one of the negotiating sides more would fail the other side’s hurdles. Depending on how the agreement comes to be understood by the public (or how it is spun), it still might fail – in either Washington or Teheran. These sorts of things do not end with the final meeting in a fancy hotel in Europe. Rather, they set the framework, the possibility, for more engagements and mutually acceptable compromises.
Supporters of the deal acknowledge that its terms do not eliminate Iran’s ability to attain nuclear weapons, but they argue that it delays such a possibility considerably. If a deal had not been signed and Iran continued its nuclear program at anything like the pace it did under sanctions and during the years George W. Bush refused to negotiate with it, the route to Teheran’s bomb might have proved short indeed. Supporters like Joe Cirincione claim the deal does a lot to prevent this, saying that its terms include:
Centrifuges cut by two-thirds, research and new facilities limited for 10 years.
Uranium gas stockpile cut by 97 percent, no new enrichment above 4 percent and no new facilities for 15 years.
Plutonium production in new reactor cut 90 percent, no new reactors for 15 years.
Monitoring of all centrifuge manufacturing for 20 years.
Confinement of all purchases to monitored procurement channel for 25 years.
Monitoring of all uranium mines for 25 years.
Permanent ban on any nuclear weapons research or activities.
Permanent ban on reprocessing of fuel to extract plutonium.
Permanent intrusive inspections.
Former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger cast the agreement as a naïve surrender by the Obama Administration, however, saying that it does little to change “three and a half decades of militant hostility to the West.” Critics likewise point to Iran’s support for radical groups like Hamas and Lebanese Hezballah as something the deal will only facilitate, given the billions of dollars the mullahs in Teheran will now have access to with the end of sanctions. Many fear that an enriched post-sanctions Iran, even without enriched uranium, will have ominous consequences for the region.
The nuclear deal was never meant to overthrow the regime in Tehran or turn it into a client of the West, however. There would have been nothing to negotiate had that been the case. The more realistic criticisms of the accord therefore limit themselves to the matter of nuclear weapon aspirations. Because the deal has no mechanism for snap inspections of Iranian military sites, or even the right to inspect many of these sites at all, there remain serious worries that the Iranian weapons program will continue. With Iran allowed to keep up to 5000 centrifuges and enrichment continuing, the capacity to pursue a bomb will certainly remain.
Your humble columnist is not yet sure which reaction to the deal has the most merit, unfortunately. A lot probably depends on subsequent steps and cooperation (or lack thereof) between the United States and Iran. The most interesting perspective about this probably came from Austin Long writing in the Washington Post, however. According to Long, if the United States wants to bomb Iran’s nuclear program to zero, the deal they just agreed to makes it a lot easier to do so. Most centrifuges the Iranians will get to keep will be concentrated in the vulnerable Natanz facility, you see, rather than the deep underground Fordo complex. There will be a lot more inspections and monitoring of Iran’s entire nuclear industry than currently exist, making it a lot easier to understand and detect a weapons program. If Iran refuses inspections of some areas, then that too will help Western analysts and spies (and perhaps bombers) know where to focus their attention. Finally, while an attack on Iran today would be seen as an illegal, preventive war, one that came in response to Iran’s violations of this deal would enjoy much more legitimacy.
Alternately, the next few years could see the Iranians live up to their promises in the deal and the Americans avoid yet another war in the Middle East. If that happens, maybe Mr. Obama will have finally earned that Nobel Prize.
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Thursday, 16 July, 2015
With the ink hardly dry on the Iran nuclear deal and the agreement still awaiting ratification, a cacophony of supportive and critical voices are already reacting. On the supportive side, American democrats, Iranian moderates and the usual voices in favor of conflict resolution above all sing the agreement’s praises. On the other side, an unlikely constellation of Israeli leaders, Iranian hardliners, Arab monarchs and American conservatives inveigh against the deal.
Even without knowing anything else about the deal, this would probably be a good sign that the final compromise was just that – a give and take that captured a fiendishly difficult to establish “zone of agreement” that both sides could sign on to, but that neither is completely happy with. Anything that favored one of the negotiating sides more would fail the other side’s hurdles. Depending on how the agreement comes to be understood by the public (or how it is spun), it still might fail – in either Washington or Teheran. These sorts of things do not end with the final meeting in a fancy hotel in Europe. Rather, they set the framework, the possibility, for more engagements and mutually acceptable compromises.
Supporters of the deal acknowledge that its terms do not eliminate Iran’s ability to attain nuclear weapons, but they argue that it delays such a possibility considerably. If a deal had not been signed and Iran continued its nuclear program at anything like the pace it did under sanctions and during the years George W. Bush refused to negotiate with it, the route to Teheran’s bomb might have proved short indeed. Supporters like Joe Cirincione claim the deal does a lot to prevent this, saying that its terms include:
Centrifuges cut by two-thirds, research and new facilities limited for 10 years.
Uranium gas stockpile cut by 97 percent, no new enrichment above 4 percent and no new facilities for 15 years.
Plutonium production in new reactor cut 90 percent, no new reactors for 15 years.
Monitoring of all centrifuge manufacturing for 20 years.
Confinement of all purchases to monitored procurement channel for 25 years.
Monitoring of all uranium mines for 25 years.
Permanent ban on any nuclear weapons research or activities.
Permanent ban on reprocessing of fuel to extract plutonium.
Permanent intrusive inspections.
Former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger cast the agreement as a naïve surrender by the Obama Administration, however, saying that it does little to change “three and a half decades of militant hostility to the West.” Critics likewise point to Iran’s support for radical groups like Hamas and Lebanese Hezballah as something the deal will only facilitate, given the billions of dollars the mullahs in Teheran will now have access to with the end of sanctions. Many fear that an enriched post-sanctions Iran, even without enriched uranium, will have ominous consequences for the region.
The nuclear deal was never meant to overthrow the regime in Tehran or turn it into a client of the West, however. There would have been nothing to negotiate had that been the case. The more realistic criticisms of the accord therefore limit themselves to the matter of nuclear weapon aspirations. Because the deal has no mechanism for snap inspections of Iranian military sites, or even the right to inspect many of these sites at all, there remain serious worries that the Iranian weapons program will continue. With Iran allowed to keep up to 5000 centrifuges and enrichment continuing, the capacity to pursue a bomb will certainly remain.
Your humble columnist is not yet sure which reaction to the deal has the most merit, unfortunately. A lot probably depends on subsequent steps and cooperation (or lack thereof) between the United States and Iran. The most interesting perspective about this probably came from Austin Long writing in the Washington Post, however. According to Long, if the United States wants to bomb Iran’s nuclear program to zero, the deal they just agreed to makes it a lot easier to do so. Most centrifuges the Iranians will get to keep will be concentrated in the vulnerable Natanz facility, you see, rather than the deep underground Fordo complex. There will be a lot more inspections and monitoring of Iran’s entire nuclear industry than currently exist, making it a lot easier to understand and detect a weapons program. If Iran refuses inspections of some areas, then that too will help Western analysts and spies (and perhaps bombers) know where to focus their attention. Finally, while an attack on Iran today would be seen as an illegal, preventive war, one that came in response to Iran’s violations of this deal would enjoy much more legitimacy.
Alternately, the next few years could see the Iranians live up to their promises in the deal and the Americans avoid yet another war in the Middle East. If that happens, maybe Mr. Obama will have finally earned that Nobel Prize.
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