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America's experience in Iraq cast a shadow on the Iranian nuclear
Date: Monday 04/02/2012 7:55
More: New York Times,
the specter of Iraq is still present in the U.S. spy agency. An analyst in the U.S. intelligence agency, who helped to develop some information about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, was disappointed after months of the outbreak of the Iraq war, has participated after the invasion to search for those weapons that have been shown not to exist. When he was later charged with assessing Iran's nuclear program, told his colleagues that the secret intelligence agency may make the same mistake again.
Says one former officials who worked with the analyst, "It feels great guilt for causing the involvement of the United States in the war, and he feared that it repeated again." Today, in a time when the analysts and others working in the CIA's efforts in order to understand Iran's nuclear ambitions, they realize that the credibility of the agency is on the line amid threats of military intervention again. The defeat of the intelligence officials on Iraq has deeply influenced the way their work, in addition to a new bodyguards are imposing on them to be more uncertainty in the evaluation of the evidence and more cautious in reaching conclusions. Officials say former intelligence This shows the vigilance appropriate to deal with the information which is often vague, while Some critics argue that the agency is not only prudent but also unstable on Iran, fearful that bears the blame for any information that could lead the United States to shed blood. Says Craig Thielmann, analyst, a former intelligence and State Department has submitted his resignation in protest against the politicization of the Bush administration for information on Iraq before the war and who is now a key member in the Assembly of gun control in Washington, "with many in the intelligence agency, a feeling of not wanting to repeat the same mistake. Community intelligence as a whole has the best experiences of the day, due to the disruption caused to Iraq because of its fabric. " Says Paul Pillar, a former analyst of the events in the Middle East Intelligence Agency and now works as director of graduate studies in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, it is believed that analysts follow the facts in their estimates relating to Iran, but the experience of Iraq is still weigh heavily on them. Pilar says, "because intelligence officials are human beings, it is not unlikely that tend to compensate for the mistakes of the past." Senior officials in the CIA analysts believe that Iran is moving some time ago to expand its infrastructure and technological capacity in order to become a nuclear power, but they believe that the Iranian leadership has not yet decided to manufacture an atomic bomb. Senior U.S. officials from current and former admit that their knowledge lacks a lot and may not be able to detect any decision concerning the resumption of Iran's weapons program, they have already concluded that Iran stopped in 2003. After provisions misleading launched on Iraq, the CIA and other intelligence agencies to impose censorship and a new budget include the need to display the analytical work on the "Red Team", a group of analysts contradict the conclusions of their colleagues and searching for weaknesses and mistakes. Analysts also need also to learn more about the sources of information they receive from spies the United States or of the means of technological espionage. In the past, analysts do not know this, which explains the key issues to include false information in Mufbarakon carried out by intelligence reports about Iraq before the war. When writing their reports they stated the sources of information with respect to important conclusions. Former intelligence official says, "I think that the experience of Iraq has given them more experience." Unlike the preamble to the Iraq war, when many critics accused the White House officials in the Bush era picks intelligence to suit their policy, some analysts say they see no evidence that the Bush administration intelligence officials to pay to reach specific answers in advance. Says Joseph Srincin Blovcherz Prime Fund - a global security institution - "has been the politicization of intelligence on Iraq dramatically. But today I do not hear complaints concerning the Department's pressure on the intelligence community to distort information." He complains that while conservative politicians in the United States and Israel on the evaluation of information on Iran, the criticism has no external influence such as the impact the White House.
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Date: Monday 04/02/2012 7:55
More: New York Times,
the specter of Iraq is still present in the U.S. spy agency. An analyst in the U.S. intelligence agency, who helped to develop some information about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, was disappointed after months of the outbreak of the Iraq war, has participated after the invasion to search for those weapons that have been shown not to exist. When he was later charged with assessing Iran's nuclear program, told his colleagues that the secret intelligence agency may make the same mistake again.
Says one former officials who worked with the analyst, "It feels great guilt for causing the involvement of the United States in the war, and he feared that it repeated again." Today, in a time when the analysts and others working in the CIA's efforts in order to understand Iran's nuclear ambitions, they realize that the credibility of the agency is on the line amid threats of military intervention again. The defeat of the intelligence officials on Iraq has deeply influenced the way their work, in addition to a new bodyguards are imposing on them to be more uncertainty in the evaluation of the evidence and more cautious in reaching conclusions. Officials say former intelligence This shows the vigilance appropriate to deal with the information which is often vague, while Some critics argue that the agency is not only prudent but also unstable on Iran, fearful that bears the blame for any information that could lead the United States to shed blood. Says Craig Thielmann, analyst, a former intelligence and State Department has submitted his resignation in protest against the politicization of the Bush administration for information on Iraq before the war and who is now a key member in the Assembly of gun control in Washington, "with many in the intelligence agency, a feeling of not wanting to repeat the same mistake. Community intelligence as a whole has the best experiences of the day, due to the disruption caused to Iraq because of its fabric. " Says Paul Pillar, a former analyst of the events in the Middle East Intelligence Agency and now works as director of graduate studies in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, it is believed that analysts follow the facts in their estimates relating to Iran, but the experience of Iraq is still weigh heavily on them. Pilar says, "because intelligence officials are human beings, it is not unlikely that tend to compensate for the mistakes of the past." Senior officials in the CIA analysts believe that Iran is moving some time ago to expand its infrastructure and technological capacity in order to become a nuclear power, but they believe that the Iranian leadership has not yet decided to manufacture an atomic bomb. Senior U.S. officials from current and former admit that their knowledge lacks a lot and may not be able to detect any decision concerning the resumption of Iran's weapons program, they have already concluded that Iran stopped in 2003. After provisions misleading launched on Iraq, the CIA and other intelligence agencies to impose censorship and a new budget include the need to display the analytical work on the "Red Team", a group of analysts contradict the conclusions of their colleagues and searching for weaknesses and mistakes. Analysts also need also to learn more about the sources of information they receive from spies the United States or of the means of technological espionage. In the past, analysts do not know this, which explains the key issues to include false information in Mufbarakon carried out by intelligence reports about Iraq before the war. When writing their reports they stated the sources of information with respect to important conclusions. Former intelligence official says, "I think that the experience of Iraq has given them more experience." Unlike the preamble to the Iraq war, when many critics accused the White House officials in the Bush era picks intelligence to suit their policy, some analysts say they see no evidence that the Bush administration intelligence officials to pay to reach specific answers in advance. Says Joseph Srincin Blovcherz Prime Fund - a global security institution - "has been the politicization of intelligence on Iraq dramatically. But today I do not hear complaints concerning the Department's pressure on the intelligence community to distort information." He complains that while conservative politicians in the United States and Israel on the evaluation of information on Iran, the criticism has no external influence such as the impact the White House.
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