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Sunday, 22 September, 2013
Tweets were the Office of the Inspector General in the Ministry of Defence on Thursday on Twitter explicit when he said, “We recommend the U.S. Central Command plan to issue an update on the state of Iraq.”
As The MacDill headquarters responsible for U.S. military operations in most of the countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the U.S. Central Command is responsible in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a plan showing how they will interact through the U.S. Army with his Iraqi army.
They included Tweet a link to access the report of the Office of the Inspector General released Thursday that found differences between the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry impede the ability of the central leadership to provide support for training and advising the Iraqi army to learn to defend himself while being subjected to external threats and to help in the fight against extremist groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq . was the report repercussions outside Iraq.
It is scheduled to end U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of next year, the United States will begin to turn away from the war there. And according to what the report says, the lessons that have been learned from the Iraq war must be made use of in Afghanistan as well.
The report consisting of 106 pages of the findings of the inspectors while they investigate how the departments of State and Defense are working together in the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq.
The failure of the United States and Iraq to reach an agreement that provides some “privileges and immunities” of U.S. troops, the Pentagon reducing drastically the number of troops at some point after the war in Iraq, which ended in 2011, which has hampered efforts to train the Iraqi army. As a result, Congress authorized the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq.
Under the plan, the U.S. Central Command shall provide administrative support contains the resources and staff, but reports of the Bureau eventually submitted to the Head of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq.
But the differences between the U.S. Central Command and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the functions of the Office led to the problems, according to the inspector general’s report.
The report finds The Mazad of aggravating the problem is the lack of clear direction from the U.S. Central Command and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reduce the number of their staff in Iraq significantly, as well as to initiate reductions in the office of security cooperation without considering the implications of military training.
The report concluded that, among other issues, the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq – did not have a sufficiently trained personnel, and no transfer of responsibilities in Iraq, the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the postwar period.
And the Office of the Inspector General recommended, among other recommendations, that the Gen. Lloyd Austin III, commander of U.S. Central Command, now plan to issue updated Iraq.
In on the report, and approved by both the U.S. Central Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a need for a new plan is being developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. Central Command said it also is working on a recruitment plan with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq and therefore will increase training and provide stronger guidance.
The U.S. Central Command issued an update is also the theater of operations plan, check with the details of Iraq’s security cooperation, as well as updating security cooperation plan with the state of Iraq.
As for Afghanistan, the U.S. Central Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed on the need to principles about the transition from the Defense Ministry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the end of combat operations in Afghanistan.
Belcher said a spokesman for the U.S. Central Command that it is premature to comment on the accuracy of the report or its contents. The Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the report as well.
He says Rick Brennan, a political analyst senior at the Rand Corporation, which contributed to policies of high-level Pentagon that of “things ready-large” in the inspector general’s report was “from a policy perspective, the offices U.S. where it operates more than one agency does not have a common understanding how to do the transfer of the process of large-scale military to the unusual relationship between the state and state-led civilian, such as the case in Iraq.
He says Brennan: The result is the most dangerous in the report is the amount of the U.S. desire to create a long-term relationship with Iraq, through the U.S. Central Command with the Iraqi army, which has hampered the changes that would limit the increase in the activities of the security cooperation led by the U.S. Defense Department. And researcher Brennan is a former military officer, he spent five years in Iraq, a senior adviser to the U.S. military in Iraq and on the verge of the publication of his book “ending the U.S. war in Iraq,” a book texture of the transition process in Iraq.
He says Brennan, “We have grown the relationship between the United States and the Iraqi army for eight years and eight months on the ground, and he wants the army to maintain this relationship, for the same reasons that make the U.S. military maintains relations with other armies in the region, which is the interests of U.S. security in the long term” .
Translation: Abdul Ali Salman
Tampa Tribune U.S.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
Tweets were the Office of the Inspector General in the Ministry of Defence on Thursday on Twitter explicit when he said, “We recommend the U.S. Central Command plan to issue an update on the state of Iraq.”
As The MacDill headquarters responsible for U.S. military operations in most of the countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the U.S. Central Command is responsible in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a plan showing how they will interact through the U.S. Army with his Iraqi army.
They included Tweet a link to access the report of the Office of the Inspector General released Thursday that found differences between the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry impede the ability of the central leadership to provide support for training and advising the Iraqi army to learn to defend himself while being subjected to external threats and to help in the fight against extremist groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq . was the report repercussions outside Iraq.
It is scheduled to end U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of next year, the United States will begin to turn away from the war there. And according to what the report says, the lessons that have been learned from the Iraq war must be made use of in Afghanistan as well.
The report consisting of 106 pages of the findings of the inspectors while they investigate how the departments of State and Defense are working together in the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq.
The failure of the United States and Iraq to reach an agreement that provides some “privileges and immunities” of U.S. troops, the Pentagon reducing drastically the number of troops at some point after the war in Iraq, which ended in 2011, which has hampered efforts to train the Iraqi army. As a result, Congress authorized the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq.
Under the plan, the U.S. Central Command shall provide administrative support contains the resources and staff, but reports of the Bureau eventually submitted to the Head of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq.
But the differences between the U.S. Central Command and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the functions of the Office led to the problems, according to the inspector general’s report.
The report finds The Mazad of aggravating the problem is the lack of clear direction from the U.S. Central Command and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reduce the number of their staff in Iraq significantly, as well as to initiate reductions in the office of security cooperation without considering the implications of military training.
The report concluded that, among other issues, the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq – did not have a sufficiently trained personnel, and no transfer of responsibilities in Iraq, the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the postwar period.
And the Office of the Inspector General recommended, among other recommendations, that the Gen. Lloyd Austin III, commander of U.S. Central Command, now plan to issue updated Iraq.
In on the report, and approved by both the U.S. Central Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a need for a new plan is being developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. Central Command said it also is working on a recruitment plan with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq and therefore will increase training and provide stronger guidance.
The U.S. Central Command issued an update is also the theater of operations plan, check with the details of Iraq’s security cooperation, as well as updating security cooperation plan with the state of Iraq.
As for Afghanistan, the U.S. Central Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed on the need to principles about the transition from the Defense Ministry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the end of combat operations in Afghanistan.
Belcher said a spokesman for the U.S. Central Command that it is premature to comment on the accuracy of the report or its contents. The Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the report as well.
He says Rick Brennan, a political analyst senior at the Rand Corporation, which contributed to policies of high-level Pentagon that of “things ready-large” in the inspector general’s report was “from a policy perspective, the offices U.S. where it operates more than one agency does not have a common understanding how to do the transfer of the process of large-scale military to the unusual relationship between the state and state-led civilian, such as the case in Iraq.
He says Brennan: The result is the most dangerous in the report is the amount of the U.S. desire to create a long-term relationship with Iraq, through the U.S. Central Command with the Iraqi army, which has hampered the changes that would limit the increase in the activities of the security cooperation led by the U.S. Defense Department. And researcher Brennan is a former military officer, he spent five years in Iraq, a senior adviser to the U.S. military in Iraq and on the verge of the publication of his book “ending the U.S. war in Iraq,” a book texture of the transition process in Iraq.
He says Brennan, “We have grown the relationship between the United States and the Iraqi army for eight years and eight months on the ground, and he wants the army to maintain this relationship, for the same reasons that make the U.S. military maintains relations with other armies in the region, which is the interests of U.S. security in the long term” .
Translation: Abdul Ali Salman
Tampa Tribune U.S.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
