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The Question Of Kurdish Independence
10/01/2012 02:38:00
By KAMARAN QARADAGHI
Every time there is a sectarian crisis in Iraq, especially between the Sunnis and the Shiites, the debate over Kurdish statehood and whether to stay a part of Iraq becomes heated.
This debate isn’t new. In 2003 and after the Baath regime was ousted, independence was raised as a way for the Kurds to take advantage of the chaos after the Iraqi government was dismantled -- especially when the occupying forces decided to dissolve the Iraqi Army, the Republican Guard, the security and intelligence apparatuses and ban Baathism as an ideology and party.
At that time, the Arabs were bogged down in this chaos while the Kurds lived in relatively stability conditions thanks to the unilateral decision to create a semi-autonomous region in 1992.
The idea of independence was even raised when Saddam was defeated in Kuwait in 1991 and his subsequent decision to withdraw his military and state institutions from the provinces of Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok.
As a result, the Kurds organized an election and the elected parliament announced a federal region in the provinces that they controlled. This act was later recognized by the new Iraqi constitution in 2005, which was approved by the Iraqis in a referendum in the same year.
“Others in Iraq and the Arabs in the region perceived not only independence, but even federalism as a “plot” to divide “the Arab homeland” by a “Zionist” plan,”
In those days, discussions on an independent Kurdistan were palpable not only among Kurds, but also in the international arena. Some would see it as a right for the Kurds, while others supported the idea of independence on the grounds that the Kurds are the biggest ethnicity in the region and the world (approximately 25 to 40 million people) without a state.
But others in Iraq and the Arabs in the region perceived not only independence, but even federalism as a “plot” to divide “the Arab homeland” by a “Zionist” plan, and this would justify oppressing the Kurds as a punishment for their secessionist treason.
The regional reactions were not too different. More than any other nations, Turkey was afraid of an independent Kurdish state and perceived it as disaster that would threaten the Turkish Republic.
But as an Arabic proverb says, “No situation can last forever,” and now talking about federalism inside and outside the Kurdish arenas has become common. With the increasing fear of the Shiite control over Iraq, autonomy has become a national demand for the Sunni Arabs as way to protect their security and administrations in their provinces. And when demanding autonomy, the Sunni Arabs refer to the success story of Iraqi Kurdistan’s federal region.
The biggest change in attitude towards the idea of federalism comes from Turkey. Other Arab regimes are busy dealing with the Arab Spring and don’t pay much attention to Iraq.
However, Turkey has no fear of a “Turkish Spring”. Now the biggest problem that faces Turkey domestically is finding a solution for the Kurdish issue in Turkey. All the channels have been tested by the Turkish state to solve this issue, including meetings with the leaders of the Kurdish rebels, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), through their representatives in Europe or through meeting with their captive leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Now it’s not taboo for Iraqi Kurdish leaders to meddle in Turkish domestic affairs by either giving advice or exchanging views between the two sides in order to find a solution for the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
For example, now Ankara doesn’t resent comments by Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani when he talks about the right of the Kurds to dream of having an independent state of their own. Just 10 years ago, the Turkish leaders were warning that the Kurds mustn’t even dream about independence.
Also, now some people are openly talking in the Turkish media about the possibility of establishing a Kurdish state in Iraq that is protected by Turkey. Even though this opinion is not yet adopted by Turkish leaders in Ankara, many authors are now writing about this possibility in case Iraq is divided into three parts: Shiites, Sunni and Kurdish.
“The question for the Kurds is: Who would protect their state?”
In this scenario, Turkey might protect the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs from Iranian hegemony via Iraqi Shiites. In other words, such a scenario might lead to the creation of a “Kurdish neighboring state that is protected by Turkey itself” according to an article by professor Mümtaz'er Türköne, who is a commentator in the Turkish Zaman newspaper and is close to the leadership of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The former president of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, had the same idea but could not express it openly despite being known as a daring leader for putting forward ideas that were seen as defiant of the ruling elite.
In 1991, Ozel told me that Turkey is a natural protector of Iraqi Kurds and the Turkmen from the Sunni Arabs, who are backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the Shiite Arabs, who are backed by Iran.
In both Erdogan and Ozal’s cases, there are pragmatic calculations that would take the Turkish interest and security into consideration by dealing with the Kurdish issue. Although the Kurds have no true state now, if this is realized there needs to be a lifeline in terms of a strong alliance that would protect this new Kurdish state that has no access to the sea. The question for the Kurds is: Who would protect their state?
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10/01/2012 02:38:00
By KAMARAN QARADAGHI
Every time there is a sectarian crisis in Iraq, especially between the Sunnis and the Shiites, the debate over Kurdish statehood and whether to stay a part of Iraq becomes heated.
This debate isn’t new. In 2003 and after the Baath regime was ousted, independence was raised as a way for the Kurds to take advantage of the chaos after the Iraqi government was dismantled -- especially when the occupying forces decided to dissolve the Iraqi Army, the Republican Guard, the security and intelligence apparatuses and ban Baathism as an ideology and party.
At that time, the Arabs were bogged down in this chaos while the Kurds lived in relatively stability conditions thanks to the unilateral decision to create a semi-autonomous region in 1992.
The idea of independence was even raised when Saddam was defeated in Kuwait in 1991 and his subsequent decision to withdraw his military and state institutions from the provinces of Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok.
As a result, the Kurds organized an election and the elected parliament announced a federal region in the provinces that they controlled. This act was later recognized by the new Iraqi constitution in 2005, which was approved by the Iraqis in a referendum in the same year.
“Others in Iraq and the Arabs in the region perceived not only independence, but even federalism as a “plot” to divide “the Arab homeland” by a “Zionist” plan,”
In those days, discussions on an independent Kurdistan were palpable not only among Kurds, but also in the international arena. Some would see it as a right for the Kurds, while others supported the idea of independence on the grounds that the Kurds are the biggest ethnicity in the region and the world (approximately 25 to 40 million people) without a state.
But others in Iraq and the Arabs in the region perceived not only independence, but even federalism as a “plot” to divide “the Arab homeland” by a “Zionist” plan, and this would justify oppressing the Kurds as a punishment for their secessionist treason.
The regional reactions were not too different. More than any other nations, Turkey was afraid of an independent Kurdish state and perceived it as disaster that would threaten the Turkish Republic.
But as an Arabic proverb says, “No situation can last forever,” and now talking about federalism inside and outside the Kurdish arenas has become common. With the increasing fear of the Shiite control over Iraq, autonomy has become a national demand for the Sunni Arabs as way to protect their security and administrations in their provinces. And when demanding autonomy, the Sunni Arabs refer to the success story of Iraqi Kurdistan’s federal region.
The biggest change in attitude towards the idea of federalism comes from Turkey. Other Arab regimes are busy dealing with the Arab Spring and don’t pay much attention to Iraq.
However, Turkey has no fear of a “Turkish Spring”. Now the biggest problem that faces Turkey domestically is finding a solution for the Kurdish issue in Turkey. All the channels have been tested by the Turkish state to solve this issue, including meetings with the leaders of the Kurdish rebels, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), through their representatives in Europe or through meeting with their captive leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Now it’s not taboo for Iraqi Kurdish leaders to meddle in Turkish domestic affairs by either giving advice or exchanging views between the two sides in order to find a solution for the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
For example, now Ankara doesn’t resent comments by Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani when he talks about the right of the Kurds to dream of having an independent state of their own. Just 10 years ago, the Turkish leaders were warning that the Kurds mustn’t even dream about independence.
Also, now some people are openly talking in the Turkish media about the possibility of establishing a Kurdish state in Iraq that is protected by Turkey. Even though this opinion is not yet adopted by Turkish leaders in Ankara, many authors are now writing about this possibility in case Iraq is divided into three parts: Shiites, Sunni and Kurdish.
“The question for the Kurds is: Who would protect their state?”
In this scenario, Turkey might protect the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs from Iranian hegemony via Iraqi Shiites. In other words, such a scenario might lead to the creation of a “Kurdish neighboring state that is protected by Turkey itself” according to an article by professor Mümtaz'er Türköne, who is a commentator in the Turkish Zaman newspaper and is close to the leadership of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The former president of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, had the same idea but could not express it openly despite being known as a daring leader for putting forward ideas that were seen as defiant of the ruling elite.
In 1991, Ozel told me that Turkey is a natural protector of Iraqi Kurds and the Turkmen from the Sunni Arabs, who are backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the Shiite Arabs, who are backed by Iran.
In both Erdogan and Ozal’s cases, there are pragmatic calculations that would take the Turkish interest and security into consideration by dealing with the Kurdish issue. Although the Kurds have no true state now, if this is realized there needs to be a lifeline in terms of a strong alliance that would protect this new Kurdish state that has no access to the sea. The question for the Kurds is: Who would protect their state?
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
