Home
January 27th, 2012
03:30 PM ET
Why Iran cannot dominate Iraq
Editor’s Note: This is an edited version of an article from the ‘Oxford Analytica Daily Brief’. Oxford Analytica is a global analysis and advisory firm that draws on a worldwide network of experts to advise its clients on their strategy and performance.
This month, Iraq’s oil minister visited Iran, prompting many pundits and policy makers to ask: Is Iraq becoming a 'client state' of Iran.
Iraq’s ruling Shia majority faces a dilemma: to identify primarily as ‘Iraqi’ or to give their first allegiance to the idea of a larger Shia community whose base is Iran, a country that supported Shia interests in Iraq during the Saddam Hussein era. To some leaders in Tehran (and in the minds of neighboring Sunni Arab governments), the answer is self-evidently the latter. As King Abdullah II of Jordan has characterised it, the Iranian efforts in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq are designed to cultivate and exploit a ‘Shia crescent’. However, even if this is Tehran's objective, there are significant countervailing forces likely to prevent Iraq from falling too far under the sway of Iran.
Potential Sunni backlash: Since the old order fell in 2003, Sunni Iraqis have been unwilling to accept leaving federal power in the hands of the Shia - along with most oil, water and access to the sea. Sunnis may lack formal political control, but there is no shortage of military-aged men capable of significant insurgency. Any suggestion that the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad is aligning with Iran would be unacceptable to Iraqi Sunnis, and to those in neighbouring Arab countries. Should Tehran 'win' in Iraq, as some Sunni Arab leaders suggest is a risk, they fear their nations being the next target of an Iranian 'programme of expansion'. This view fails to account for how internally divided and inward-looking the Iranian regime in fact is. But it is a view widely held in the region.
Iraqi nationalism: Another reason Tehran’s influence will be limited is the existence of a core Iraqi nationalist sentiment across the local Shia community. Historical animosity between Persians and Arabs is felt deeply in Iraq, reinforced by the legacy of the Iran-Iraq war. Recent patterns of trade and business, religious tourism, political support and malign military activities, do not necessarily mean that Iraq is closer to aligning itself with Iran. Thus while Iraqi Shia groups will use Iranian support to boost their position in the local political scene, but they have no desire to subject themselves again to subservience and external control.
History and religion: Longstanding differences in religious cultural tradition between Iraqi Shias’ theological attitude toward politics (the ‘Najaf’ school) and Iran's politically active ideology (the ‘guardianship by the clergy’) separates the two countries, as does Iraqi’s awareness that Iran mistreats its Shia minorities.
Iran does aspire to a significant role in Iraq. It will continue to provide material, economic and covert military support to groups there, attempting to ensure Iraq is not a threat to its security, to create a security buffer against hostile Arab countries, and to counter U.S. influence in the region. Yet for the three reasons mentioned, Iran will find that its effort to gain influence in Iraq is far less successful than it hopes, or some of its Arab neighbours fear. Iran may find that unlike Syria and Lebanon's Hezbollah, its overtures are not particularly welcome among Iraqi Shias.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
